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James Manor
A major increase in the amount of aid to less
developed countries is widely anticipated, by or
soon after late 2005, to bolster efforts to achieve
theMillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs).1 The
sums involved may not be as substantial as many
expect, and they come mainly from Europe, but
we are still likely to see a significant enhancement
of funds for development.2 With them will come
both opportunities and dangers – which the articles
in this collection analyse.We give more attention
to the dangers, because we seek tominimise them.
The contributors to this IDS Bulletin come from
a diversity of countries and disciplines. They work
in different types of institutions – research centres,
(recipient and donor) government agencies and
non-governmental organisations.3 They also offer
diverse views.
This is vividly apparent from the first two articles
by White and by Killick, who take starkly
contrasting positions on the advisability of increased
aid. White presents evidence to support the view
that there is indeed a serious shortfall in aid
disbursements.He then takes issue with those who
claim that additional aid will produce negative
effects, that recipient governments’ absorptive
capacity imposes severe constraints and that
allocating aid on the basis of need perversely
encourages countries to remain needy. By contrast,
Killick argues that while much of Africa (his main
concern) has been doing reasonably well in recent
times, additional aid will cause donors and
recipients alike to be preoccupied with issues of
quantity, and impede solutions to remaining
problems by diverting attention from the more
crucial issues of the quality or effectiveness of aid.
The daunting difficulties that attend efforts to solve
those remaining problems may thus be
compounded.White and Killick tend to talk past
one another rather than disagreeing on specific
points – although they are plainly at odds over the
reliability of quantitative analyses on aid
effectiveness, they are not entirely at loggerheads.
Both are, for example, anxious about the possibility
that additional assistance will worsen the
dependence on aid ofmany recipient governments,
andWhite quotes Killick’s work approvingly at one
point. But for the most part, they disagree.
The other articles in this collection locate
themselves somewhere between those two
viewpoints, so that there is strong resonance among
them – among articles by contributors fromNorth
and South, and frompeople of different professional
backgrounds. See, for example, the ways in which
arguments echo one another in the articles by de
Renzio (an Italian working in a British policy studies
centre), Therkildsen (a Danish academic), Kitabire
(a Ugandan government official), Saasa (a Zambian
academic) and Stockmayer (an official of the
German aid agency).
Our main concern is to anticipate the problems
that will inevitably attend a surge in aid so that they
can be tackled. This is crucial because if a major
increase in aid yields disappointing results, the future
of development assistance could be called into
question – it could make aid, not poverty, history.
A short-term increase could trigger a long-term
decline. That danger has been magnified by the
exaggerated expectations which some advocates of
increased aid have inspired, by (as Therkildsen puts
it) ‘pretending that miracles will occur’. There is a
fine line between sensible attempts tomake a strong
case for greater aid and unrealistic claims which will
lead to disillusionment that could eventually make
aid programmes unsustainable. That line has
sometimes been crossed. See, for example, the
UnitedNations Millennium Project’s arguments:
● that increased funds can end aid dependency in
less developed countries,
● that export-led growth on East Asian lines can
produce breakthroughs for African economies,
and
● that governance problems and human resource
constraints in recipient countries need not
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impede significant progress towards the
Millennium Development Goals.4
(These and other themes are discussed in more
detail below). The Project’s eagerness to persuade
developed countries to be more generous is
understandable and in some ways admirable, but
their “can do” assertions may generate excessive
expectations.
The contributors to this collection identify and
analyse a broad array of issues that also must be
addressed if we are to maximise the constructive
impact of additional aid. Some of these have had
little attention. But we begin with a concern that
has preoccupied much recent discussion, in the
media and in conference rooms – the problem of
recipient countries’ absorptive capacity.
1 Absorptive capacity
Absorptive capacity – the ability to put aid to
effective use – is in doubt as a result of poor
governance, sclerotic administrative agencies and,
above all, shortages of human resources. These
shortages are often said to exist in the private and
voluntary sectors, but anxieties mainly arise about
the public sector – both at senior administrative
levels and at lower levels in specific (and crucial)
sectors like health and education.
Some advocates of increased aid say little about
this problem.A key document from theMillennium
Project identifies recipients’ capacity constraints as
amajor barrier, but then offers almost no comment
– one page out of 307 – on how to tackle it.5 Its
authors characterise such constraints as investment
opportunities rather than as problems. That
argument would have beenmore persuasive if they
explained how additional aid might ease such
constraints, but they do not do so. Thus (as
Therkildsen says), they focus on what should be
done but not how it can be done.6
Others deal with the issue in detail. The
Commission for Africa examines different
dimensions of the problem – at inter-governmental
level, at the national level and at sub-national and
local levels in connection with the provision of
infrastructure and services. And at each of these
three levels, the problem is shown to be multi-
dimensional.7 White’s article here also takes the
capacity issue head on. He argues that there are
plenty of well-trained and highly motivated
personnel even in outlying districts of impoverished
African countries, waiting for the arrival of additional
funds that will enable them to do their jobs.
Other contributors to this collection are more
anxious about absorptive capacity. De Renzio
examines it at length, providing a typology of
constraints on various types of capacity – both short
term and long term.The former includes constraints
arising out of inadequate infrastructure and
equipment, perverse incentives for public officials
and weak public expendituremanagement systems.
Long-term constraints include major deficiencies
in institutions and policy processes and shortages
of technical andmanagerial skills. These problems
are so numerous and varied that they cry out for
attention, but they have received little – perhaps
because a discussion of how to tackle them might
suggest how great the difficulties are, thus
undermining the (in many ways admirable) case
for increased aid.Many of de Renzio’s concerns are
echoed in the articles by Kitabire, Stockmayer and
Therkildsen (who argues that the key constraint is
not money but people).
Bossert’s articleassesses human resourceconstraints
in great detail. His analysis is grounded in research
on the health sector, but the approach is clearly
relevant to other spheres as well.He argues that it is
crucial to identify the types,densities anddistribution
of workers needed to make headway towards the
MDGs.He then provides amethodology that can be
used first to estimate human resource constraints,
and then to tackle them.He emphasises theneed for
separate investigations of how systems’ financial,
educational and management capacities contribute
to the effectiveness of human resources. He then
stresses the importance of several problems that cut
across sectors – workers’ motivation, absenteeism,
variations in the attractions of different professions,
the brain drain and the premature deaths of key
workers from HIV/AIDS. He also pays attention to
the question of the political feasibility of potential
remedies – stressing the need to understand regime
type, establishedprocesses andprocedures, levels of
corruption, and the enforcement capacity of the state.
It is also important to determine the position and
influenceofkey stakeholders, so that political strategies
will increase support and reduceopposition tochange.
His article makes it plain that we face daunting
capacity problems, but it also offers some useful
guidance on how they might be minimised – by
providing tools for diagnosing them, by suggesting
certain short-term measures that can ease the
IDS Bulletin 36.3 Increased Aid: Minimising Problems, Maximising Gains
2
problem and by stressing the need for longer-term
strategies, since quick fixes here will fall short.
Finally, another quite distinctive perspective on
all of this is worth noting. Sobhan, an experienced
analyst of the aid and development process in
Bangladesh, argues here that the most serious
problem is often neither a lack of absorptive capacity
nor inadequate aid funds. It is a lack of commitment
on the part of recipient governments to reprioritise
expenditures and to undertake the changes in
governance that are essential to the productive use
of aid.He is also concerned by evidence that donors
undercut recipient governments’ ownership of (and
thus commitment to) reforms by adopting a one-
size-fits-all approach in diverse settings. Eyben’s
contribution, and Saasa’s article based on Zambia’s
experience, reinforce the point when they stress
the importance of the compatibility of donor
programmes with recipient aspirations. Sobhan’s
emphasis on the importance of governance raises
an issue which deserves a separate discussion.
2 The pace and delicacy of
governance reforms
The various advocates of increased aid offer different
views on the importance of governance reform as
an element of the process that will unfold once
donors commit themselves to provide more funds
– and on the possibility that it might be a condition
for the receipt of additional aid. Some advocates
say little about this, but theCommission for Africa
argues that improvements in governance are
essential, and that they must be addressed as a
matter of urgency.8
But can governance reforms occur swiftly? This
will be necessary if – as is likely – a sudden surge
in aid occurs. The evidence frommultiple sources
strongly suggests that haste in the pursuit of such
reforms may scuttle hopes of improvement, and
may even undo hard-won achievements that have
recently occurred.
The article here by Stockmayer, who oversees
the governance programme at the German
development agency GTZ, stresses precisely this
point (as does Kitabire). He draws on donors’
experience in this sphere to argue that governance
reforms take time to occur, and –more importantly
– to gain the wide acceptance among both policy
makers (who need to be convinced that changes are
non-threatening) and citizens (whose support is
critical to make them sustainable). Two recent sets
of Institute ofDevelopment Studies (IDS) case studies
of successful governance reforms reached a similar
conclusion – indeed, it is one of their principal
findings. They found that such reforms have the
greatest promise when they are pursued at an
incremental pace – allowing for sufficient time for
demonstration effects from experiments tomake an
impact on bothpolicy makers and ordinary people.9
Stockmayer stresses that in practice, any
governance reform actually entails ‘ahost of different
reform processes … which depend on different
coalitions of actors and involve different resources’.
They are not just complex, but also lengthy and
delicate.His arguments on each of these issues merit
a little more attention.
He explains that it takes a long time to develop
adequate support for instruments that ensure that
the policy process is gender sensitive, that anti-
corruption efforts begin to bite and that service
delivery is based in part on rights-based approaches
to development. Such instruments need to be
backed by ‘almost every part of society’, and that
backing cannot be obtained overnight. If the pace
of change is now to accelerate in response to
additional flows of aid, governance reforms may
founder – and that may jeopardise abundant aid
flows over the longer term.
When such reforms begin to take root, they
always rest on new, fragile understandings and
tenuous balances in power relations between
different sets of actors. These are easily disrupted,
and Stockmayer argues that a surge in aid will
inevitably alter both power balances and the
direction that reforms will take. (Schneider’s
quantitative data reinforces the point – by showing
that when aid is fragmented, as it is likely to be, it
tends to undermine governance in recipient
countries.) This could destroy established systems
of commonly accepted rules, which are essential
to successful development.
3 Fragmented disbursement of
additional aid
It appears likely that the additional aid which
emerges will be delivered in a somewhat fragmented
and poorly coordinated manner, for reasons that
are explained below. This would fly in the face of
donors’ commitment, signed in Rome in 2003, to
make greater harmonisation among their efforts a
priority – see the articles here by White, de Renzio
and Saasa. This takes some explaining.
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Many bilateral donor agencies (and the
governments of which they are apart) are at present
reluctant to commit substantial sums tomultilateral
institutions or to new vehicles that will be strongly
influenced by them. Many donors doubt the
effectiveness of United Nations agencies, and are
worried by some of the views set out by the UN
Millennium Project – for example, the claim that
governance is a serious problem only in certain
countries (points stressed in the article by
Stockmayer).But many alsohesitate to release funds
to theWorldBank,partly because they are uncertain
about thedirection it may take under PaulWolfowitz.
In private comments, officials at three European
development agencies indicate that the irritation at
his appointment is far more intense thanpolitepublic
statements suggest. Some are also concerned about
an influentialWorld Bank report, written before he
was named, criticising the Bank’s recent emphasis
on theMDGs and on social programmes to achieve
them.10 And they worry that conflict between the
World Bank and the United Nations over the
management ofmulti-lateral funds – conflict which
is made more likely by the apparent antipathy
between leaders of theUNMillennium Project and
Wolfowitz –may undermine the effectiveness of the
entire enterprise. Some donor governments and
bilateral agencies are also strongly committed to
specific types of development programmes or certain
development sectors which they fear may not be
adequately served by multi-lateral arrangements.11
For all of these reasons, they are likely to retain control
over much of the additional aid that is disbursed.12
The potential fragmentation of donor efforts has
triggered anxieties on at least four fronts.
● Recipient governments will be compelled to
commit far too many scarce human resources
to the negotiation and management of
fragmented donor initiatives. They fear that this
will weaken still further the absorptive capacity
of many countries. This is stressed in the
contributions by deRenzio, Therkildsen, Saxena,
Schneider and Saasa who speaks of ‘unbearable
transaction costs, particularly for the most aid
dependent developing countries of Africa’.
● Fragmentation will undermine the clarity and
simplicity of the aid process, which some
contributors to this collection (e.g. Saasa again)
see as crucial to the achievability of recipients’
aspirations.This partly explains why Schneider’s
quantitative analysis here indicates that
fragmented aid tends to undermine governance
in recipient countries.
● The emphasis by some donors on certain sectors
(e.g. health, education) may cause overall
development efforts to become so unbalanced
that harm will be done in some other sectors, as
scarce human resources are drawn into well-
funded sectors and away fromothers that remain
crucial. Kitabire fears a ‘proliferation of costly,
misaligned projects’ which will often require
counterpart spending that diverts funds from
sectors which governments prioritise. He
explains that Uganda now insists that aid
conforms to its strategic priorities, so that it turns
down some aid proposals – a theme echoed by
Saxena from India. This would happen more
often in those countries if increased aid were
earmarked for sectors favoured by bilaterals.
Other recipient governments would accept such
aid, but in the process, their priorities and thus
their ownership of development strategies
(which many contributors regard as essential)
would be undermined.
● An erosion of the recipients’ sense of ownership
(a serious concern to White and Eyben) may
weaken their commitment to reprioritise public
expenditure and to improve governance – which
Sobhan argues is oftenmore important than the
amounts of funds that are available.
4 Donors’ incapacities and
unhelpful habits
Much of the debate on the implications of increased
aid pays little heed to the possibility that donors
might undermine its predictability, quality and
accountability. The key document from the
Millennium Project,mentioned above, is virtually
silent on the subject. There is only one mention of
aid quality in the entire report. By contrast, several
contributors to this collection (like theCommission
for Africa) regard this as an issue of deep concern
– and there is muchmore to it than the anxiety that
aid may be disbursed in a fragmented manner.
Eyben’s article here argues that a surge in aid could
magnify the tendency of current donor practices to
disempower recipient governments and their civil
societies. She is especially concerned about the
potentially damaging impact of ‘results-based
management’ which donors endorsed at Monterrey
in 2002 as the optimal approach. It tends strongly to
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disempower because it enables donors first todecide
what knowledge is admissible in defining problems
and second to identify solutions, so that recipient
governments have too little voice in co-determining
the types of results that are to be sought and the
strategies that will be adopted to pursue them.
The imperative for upward reporting to donors
who have used their power to define the problem
and the solutionmay reduce recipient governments’
accountability to their own citizens whose views
on urgent problems and preferred solutions may
differ from those of donors. In principle, if results-
basedmanagement were based on amore equitable
balance of influence between donors and recipient
governments, it might lead to less undesirable
outcomes. But in practice, this is very difficult to
achieve.
Eyben argues that this reinforces donors’ learning
incapacities. And ‘it can … create unintended
consequences of resistance’ by recipients – of the
kind which Kitabire describes in his article in
Uganda.
As an alternative, Eyben proposes:
investing in relationships that would privilege
different perspectives and new answers to
managing the turbulent environment of which
donors are part and contribute to creating. Aid
might be more effective with less strategy and
more improvisation.
She stresses the need for ‘a different approach
to planning and implementing solutions that
recognises rather than ignores the disagreement
and uncertainty’.
The contribution by Conyers and Mellors on
Africa reinforces many of these points, and then
raises one further concern. They argue that donors’
excessive use of short-term consultants, together
with the rapid turnover of donor staff, damages the
institutional memory of donor agencies and
undermines their capacity to develop an in-depth
understanding of conditions in recipient countries.
Their pessimism about the prospects for greater
donor openness and flexibility is set out in
unvarnished language:
Are we prepared to defy these constraints and
make the necessary changes in order to meet
Africa’s very real humanitarian needs? If we are
not, the prospects are bleak. Pushing more
money through a defective system is wasteful
and could do more harm than good.
Some readers may feel that they overstate the
problem. But given the recent donor consensus on
results-basedmanagement, it appears unlikely that
we will see much change in donor strategies and
habits of mind anytime soon.
5 Can additional funds end aid
dependency?
Some advocates of increased aid argue that it will
enable seriously underdeveloped countries to break
out of their dependence on aid (which is plainly a
serious problem, as Table 1 in de Renzio’s article
illustrates –but see also,White’s counter-arguments).
In these advocates’ view, additional aid –by reducing
poverty and disease – will unleash the talents of
ordinary people, making economies more
productive.Major new investments in infrastructure
will have a similar effect. And some argue that
additional aid will alsoopen the way to the successful
pursuit of export-led growth of the kind that lifted
much of East and Southeast Asia out of destitution
and dependence on aid. All of the contributors to
this collection share the hope that such outcomes
will occur, but some are sceptical about how realistic
that hope is. Their views are worth noting, since
they suggest that we should adjust both our
expectations and current plans for the delivery of
additional aid. There are four issues to consider.
First, even if export-led growth has the potential
to liberate less developed countries from aid
dependency (and some doubt that it does), amajor
influx of additional funds may undermine
governments’ efforts to promote it. It may – as the
earlier reference toKitabire’s article indicates – cause
careful, painful efforts to promote fiscal prudence
(which are intended to promote national sovereignty
and export-led growth) to unravel. (Saasa’s article
indicates that in Zambia, Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growth has often declined during years in
which aid flows have been most abundant. That
trend could be explained by certain other things,
but it is nonetheless worrying.) And it may drive
up the value of recipient governments’ currencies
which would make exports more expensive and
defeat efforts to base growth on rising exports.There
may be, in other words, potential contradictions




Second, (to reiterate a point made earlier) a
further and possibly damaging contradiction has
been identified by the articles by Saasa and by
Conyers andMellors.On present evidence,many
of the donor agencies that will provide additional
aid will insist on controlling the disbursement
process for most of the funds that they release.This
means that each individual donor will also insist
that recipient governments conform to the
distinctive procedures that it follows. To make
matters worse, the current enthusiasm for new
forms of publicmanagement will ensure that these
procedures will undergo frequent changes. All of
this will place a heavy burden on recipient
governments which will have to invest time and
scarce human resources in efforts to master these
diverse procedures. Instead ofmaking disbursement
processes more predictable and simpler – which
Saasa regards as an urgent need – they will become
even more unstable and complex. This makes it
less likely that recipient governments will escape
aid dependency, which both White and Killick –
despite their other disagreements – have identified
as a serious concern.
Third, it appears likely that much of the
additional aid will come in the formof loans rather
than grants, which will impede recipients’ efforts
to break out of indebtedness and their dependence
on aid. There is certainly a case for grants rather
than loans, but some donor governments are
reluctant to give great emphasis to grants because
it might make it difficult to replenish the funds of
institutions like theWorld Bank. If amajor shift to
grants occurred, and then in a few years certain key
donors reduced their disbursements to such
institutions, they might find themselves far less able
to make a constructive impact.
Finally, if recent form is any guide,many donors
will insist that recipient governments create special
agencies to administer the additional funds that
they provide. These structures run parallel to
mainstream administrative instruments and
undermine the latter in two important ways. They
draw talented personnel out of already incapacitated
lineministries.And by offering higher salaries and
commanding greater resources than mainstream
government ministries, they undermine bothmorale
within them and popular regard for them – which
threatens the legitimacy of recipient governments
more generally (Stockmayer stresses this point).
TheWorldBank’s global programme to create “social
funds” has – in many (though not all) countries –
led to the creation of such parallel agencies. Very
substantial funds have often been channelled
through these agencies. Some bilaterals also favour
parallel agencies for programmes in individual
sectors like health and education. These agencies
often serve crucial purposes in the short term, in
addressing emergencies or extreme distress. But if
sustained over the longer term(as tends to happen),
they erode the legitimacy of governments and their
mainstream agencies – and enhancing that
legitimacy is an exceedingly important objective.
Additional aid, managed in this way, tends to
weaken governments – and to make it still harder
to break out of dependency on aid.13
This need not happen.Conyers andMellors refer
to positive experiences in severalAfrican countries
– in which aid was channelled throughmainstream
government agencies and integrated into efforts to
build the capacity elected local councils. One of
the key findings from the two sets of recent IDS
studies mentioned above – of successful
development programmes – echoed this theme.14
When major initiatives are routed through
mainstreamministries, and when they are integrated
with elected councils at or near the local level, they
tend strongly to succeed, to be sustainable, and to
enhance the effectiveness and thus the legitimacy
of governments.
Some contributors to this collection oppose a
major increase in aid.Killick is themost forthright,
andKitabire’s detailed, closely argued case includes
this comment: ‘substantially increasing donor aid
is not the way to achieve these goals (poverty
reduction and an end to aid dependency) in a
sustainable manner’.Most of the articles here offer
less negative views, but they make it clear that a
number of very real problems will attend an increase
in aid. Recipient governments’ efforts to promote
fiscal discipline and export-led growth already face
serious impediments, and a major influx of
additional aid may unhinge them altogether. The
likely fragmentation of donor efforts may undermine
recipient governments’ absorptive capacity.
Governance reforms, which some see as crucial to
the effective use of additional aid,may be damaged
or wrecked if – as seems inevitable – they are
accelerated in response to increased aid. These and
other problems analysed here need to be taken
seriously, since steps can be taken to deal with them.
Many articles in this collection make that clear
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by offering suggestions that could ease these
difficulties. See, for example, White and Sobhan
on the need to pay attention to recipient
governments’ ownership development programmes,
de Renzio on a broad array of issues, Sobhan on
donor-recipient relations, Bossert on devices that
can identify and tackle human resource constraints
and Eyben on remedies for donors’ learning
disabilities. Thesemerit attention, because if these
problems are not addressed, they could – within a
few years – provide ammunition for those who
claim incorrectly that aid cannot work, and discredit
the case for generous aid flows.We want aid to be




1. Substantial additional funds have already been provided
to tackleHIV/AIDS, and further increases are likely as a
result of the efforts of theCommission for Africa (working
closely with the British government), the work of the
United Nations Millennium Project and pledges by G8
members to increase their aid commitments. Many
member governments in the European Union have
pledged major increases in aid – although the Italian,
Austrian and Portuguese governments have (at the time
of writing) been more hesitant than their neighbours.
The Japanese government has committed itself to a
substantial increase in aid toAfrica. TheUS government
has also provided extra funds – fewer in practice than
the initial announcement stated, and very much on its
own terms – through theMillenniumChallengeAccount.
As also seen in this Introduction, other donors may also
channel much of their aid through discrete vehicles, and
fragment the overall effort in the process.
2. In addition to increased aid disbursements, further funds
will probably be liberated as a result of the writing off of
some countries’ debts to the World Bank, the IMF and
theAfricanDevelopment Bank. Less developed countries
may also benefit from the partial lifting of trade barriers
by countries in the North, although that is less likely.
3. They participated in a workshop in London on these
issues in March 2005, organised by the Institute of
Development Studies and funded by theDepartment for
International Development.
4. The Global Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development
Goals, 23 September 2004.
5. UNMillennium Project (2004).
6. See Table 1 in Therkildsen’s article in this IDS Bulletin.
He argues that those associated with the Millennium
Project tend to focus almost entirely on cellA in that table
– which he regards as a serious problem.
7. See The Report of the Commission for Africa, Part 2: 4 and
Annex 6.
8. In his article in this IDS Bulletin, Stockmayer welcomes
this when he says that: ‘Closing our eyes to the recent
history of the civil service, especially in countries with
weak institutions, cannot be a recipe for effective capacity
creation for reaching theMDGs’.
9. They also found that, in diversity of contexts,development
programmes tended to succeed (a) when they allowed
the preferences of people at the grassroots to influence
the policy process, since greater constructive capacity
exists at that level than anhigher levels in political systems,
and (b) when they avoided the creation of parallel agencies
for the implementation of initiatives that bypass
mainstreamgovernment ministries and thus undermine
their effectiveness and legitimacy. These studies were
carried out for the World Bank by teams organised by
the Institute of Development Studies in late 2004. One
set focused on nine case studies in ‘Low IncomeCountries
under Stress’, and the other focused on reforms in Brazil,
Uganda and India.
10. This was the Operations Evaluation Department’s 2005
Annual Review of Development Effectiveness, which the
FinancialTimes (20 May 2005) described as ‘hard-hitting’.
11. This became apparent at ameeting of European Finance
Ministers in February 2005.The anxiety that this inspired
in the British government which had pressed for more
generous commitments (and from which this information
comes) was not entirely eased inMay/June 2005, when
such commitments were eventually made.Worries remain
that while increased aid may be forthcoming, it may
mainly be disbursed through bilateral channels – leading
to fragmentation.
12.These comments are based on discussions with
practitioners at three bilateral European development
agencies.
13. It became apparent, at a conference on successful
governance reforms in less developed countries at the
World Bank in April 2005, that the dangers posed by
parallel agencies are recognised by many practitioners
there. But such initiatives have developed sufficient
momentum that we can expect them to persist in many
cases for some time yet.
14. See for example, J.Manor, forthcoming 2005.
References
Manor, J., (ed.), 2005, SuccessfulGovernanceReforms
inLow IncomeCountries under Stress,Washington,
DC: TheWorld Bank, forthcoming
UN Millennium Project, 2004, A Practical Plan to
Achieve theMillenniumDevelopment Goals, New
York: United Nations
